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Mutual funds (MFs) have existed for more than a century
and have played an active role in financial markets all
around the world. The first modern mutual fund came up in2699 3349.
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2.05.004the US in 1924 and there were more than 700 funds that
existed in the US just before the Great Depression.1 In
India, however, the first mutual fund company was the
government sponsored Unit Trust of India, which was
established in 1963 and was the only mutual fund available
to investors until public sector banks became eligible to
offer mutual funds in the 1980s. But it wasn’t until the mid
1990s when the private sector was also allowed to compete
that the industry saw a real growth in assets.
Despite this growth,mutual funds remain a small player in
Indian financial markets. Mutual funds account for only
around 3% of the overall equity market capitalisation in India
while they represent more than 30% of the market capital-
isation in the US. The Indian mutual fund industry manages1 2012 Investment Company Fact Book.
reserved.
246 J.R. Kale, V. Panchapagesanroughly $87.5 billion of assets, which constitute only about
0.4% of the global assets under management.2 Given the
dearth of longer-term investment options in emerging
markets such as India where household savings are usually
high, onewouldexpectmutual funds tobecomepopular once
made available. Moreover, one would expect poorly literate
Indian investors to participate in the economy’s growth by
outsourcing the complex process of investing tomutual funds
rather than trying to do it themselves.
Yet, for various reasons, mutual funds have not been the
investment of choice for Indian households. Government
estimates suggest that investments in security related
investments, including mutual funds, have hovered around
4e5% of household savings for more than a decade despite
significant governmental concessions.3 Physical assets such
as real estate and gold along with the “safer” bank deposits
continue to be sought after by Indian investors. Aside of
structural reasons, lack of objective and scientific research
on mutual funds has also hurt the promotion of the culture
of investing through intermediaries among Indians. This
article is an attempt to examine the state of the Indian
mutual fund industry through a round table discussion with
leading industry leaders and view some of its challenges
and opportunities from an academic point of view.
There is a significant amount of global academic
research on mutual funds, and these studies have, by and
large, concentrated on the MF industry in the US primarily
because of data availability.4 Even in the US, the first
serious academic study on mutual funds came more than
forty years after the establishment of the first modern
mutual fund.5 There has been no serious work on the
performance of the Indian mutual fund industry for lack of
data though there have been some studies that examine
short-term impact of regulatory rule changes.6
The basic need for most research is data on mutual fund
returns, specifically historical daily fund returns. Though
recent offerings from some data vendors include daily
returns on mutual funds, they are only available for existing
funds and not for funds that have closed or merged with
another fund in the past. The bias induced by survivorship
biasmakes it difficult to interpret the returns and to perform
meaningful research on the Indian mutual fund industry.
Broadly, global mutual fund research is focused on one or
more of the following themes: (i) the performance of mutual
funds, individually and as a group, including the persistence
in performance across time (ii) the ability of the manager to
timemarket trends and to pick stocks that increase in value,
(iii) the relation or sensitivity of fund flows to fund2 Ibid.
3 Report of the Working Group on Savings during the various Five-
year plans.
4 For US MFs, researchers have access to data for a number of years
on returns, quarterly portfolio holdings, voting record, and
governance.
5 The first seminal work on US mutual fund industry was by Jensen
in 1968 where he showed that MF managers, on average, don’t
outperform the market net of fees and expenses.
6 See, for example, Anagol and Kim (2012).performance, (iv) the fund managers’ incentives for risk-
taking, (v) the explicit and implicit fund fees and costs, (vi)
the trading performance of funds, (vii) fund governance
structures, and finally, (vii) regulation. Describing the state
of research in all aspects of MFs is beyond the scope of our
paper; hence we will focus on a few of these areas.
Mutual fund performance and fund manager
ability
The two most important questions with respect to MF
performance and manager ability are: Do MFs earn a better
return than what investors can earn on their own? And, do
fund managers have superior ability to make better
investments than other investors? Since funds charge
investors fees in various forms for their services, it is their
net-of-fees return that needs to be compared to a suitable
benchmark. The literature is divided on the issue of
whether MFs provide superior investment performance. In
his seminal paper, Jensen (1968) finds that for the sample
period 1945e1964, MFs earned an excess net of fees (gross)
return over the market of 1.1% (0.4%), and that over 66%
(58%) of the MFs in the sample earned negative abnormal
net (gross) returns. Thus, Jensen concludes that MFs do not
do better than random chance irrespective of whether we
consider their gross or net returns. Several later
researchers (e.g., Ippolito (1989), Brown and Goetzmann
(1995), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), and Carhart (1997))
confirm Jensen’s conclusion that MF managers do not
possess any superior investment skill. Moreover,
researchers like Carhart (1997) show that there is persis-
tence only in under performance as poorly managed funds
remain under performers on a consistent basis.
Other researchers are more sympathetic to the perfor-
mance of MFs. In a theoretical paper, Berk and Green (2004)
demonstrate that MFs may not earn superior returns even if
fundmanagers possess superior ability. The intuition for their
result is that managerial ability is in limited supply and that
there are diminishing returns to ability. In a competitive
environment, investors supply more funds to better-
performing managers, which drives their abnormal perfor-
mance to zero. Inferior MF performance can also be attrib-
uted to the fact that MFs are forced to trade for liquidity
reasons following abnormal fund outflows/inflows. Their
total abnormal return thus may be zero as it is the average of
informed and liquidity-induced trades. Edelen (1999)
provides evidence consistent with liquidity-induced trading
by MFs. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) find that future
returns relate negatively with current fund size and argue
that this negative relation is due to liquidity costs.
The papers described above evaluate MF performance
on the basis of their abnormal returns relative to some
benchmark return-generating process (see Carhart (1997)
and Ferson and Schadt (1996)). Another set of papers
focus not on return performance but analyse fund portfolio
holdings to detect superior ability. Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers (1997) present two such holdings-
based performance measures, the return attributable to
a manager’s “stock-picking” ability and a return that
relates to the manager’s “market-timing” ability. Daniel
et al. (1997) and other papers (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman
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and Wermers (2000)) that use holdings-based performance
measures find evidence suggesting that fund managers
possess superior ability.
More recently, researchers have proposed more novel
methods for identifying whether a fund manager exhibits
superiorability. Kacperszyk, Sialm,andZheng (2005) compute
an investment concentration index for a fund’s portfolio
holdings that is akin to the Herfindahl Index based on the
deviations of the fund’s holding in 10 industry groups from the
market portfolio weights. They propose that greater invest-
ment concentration imposes costs on the manager from not
being diversified and, hence, only the “better” managers will
concentrate investment and find empirical evidence consis-
tent with their conjecture. In a related vein, Huang and Kale
(2012) present a theoretical model which demonstrates that
“better” managers will take into account not simply the
information specific to a firm but will also generate informa-
tion on firms that are economically linked to the firm through
supply-chain relationships. These authors present evidence
which shows that the level of a fund’s investment in the linked
industries is a better predictor of the fund’s performance
(return- and holdings-based) than the fund’s investment
concentration in general or in one industry.
There are other papers proposing new measures of fund
managers’ superior ability. Among them, Cohen, Coval, and
Pastor (2005) index manager quality to the manager’s
investment consistency with “star” managers, Kacperczyk
and Seru (2007) propose a measure for determining how
much a manager depends on private information,
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) compute a measure
for the manager’s unobserved “activeness,” Da, Gao, and
Jagannathan (2011) consider the fund’s investment in
stocks with higher probability of informed trading, and
Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) analyse the
abnormal returns around subsequent earnings announce-
ments of stock purchased (sold) by MFs to detect the
manager’s ability to “forecast economic fundamentals”.
There has been no rigorous academic study on the
performance of mutual funds in India though a few studies
such as Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2011) examine
performance across many countries including India. Using
a four-factor model, they present evidence for India that is
similar to that suggested by Carhart (1997): there is persis-
tence in performance only for poorly performing mutual
funds. Interestingly they point out that, unlike in the US,
funds that are located outside the US do not face decreasing
returns to scale. In the absence of academic studies, industry
agencies such as S&P/CRISIL come out with their evaluation
of the industry. A recent S&P/CRISIL report suggests that the
majority of actively managed mutual funds in India under-
performed their benchmarks over the five years between
2007 and 2011. Also, given the limited investable universe for
Indian fundmanagers, it is possible that herding ismuchmore
significant in India than in the US.Fund manager incentives, fund flows, and fund
performance
A ruling by the Department of Labour in the US, in the 1970s
mandated that those who had fiduciary responsibilitiesemanating from managing others’ money could not be paid
bonus contracts. The reason provided was that bonus
contracts that reward good performance but do not punish
poor performance imply a convex (option-like) payoff func-
tion for a fund manager. This convexity provides the incen-
tive for managers to undertake unduly risky investments.
Researchers subsequently noted that several institutional
factors and empirical regularities acted together in such
a way to make the manager’s payoff function convex.
Specifically, the facts are that most managers are paid
a percentage of the assets under management, and better
fund performance attracts disproportionately greater fund
inflows than the outflows associated with poor performance.
In the empirical research on this subject, Brown, Van
Harlow, and Starks (1996) provide evidence that is consis-
tent with this implied convexity and show that funds with
poor performance increase the riskiness of their portfolio.
Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2012) estimate the
level of convexity in flow-performance relationship for 28
countries including India and find that India is one of the
nine countries in addition to the US with significant level of
convexity. Lynch and Musto (2003) and Berk and Green
(2004) analyse the determinants of the floweperformance
relation and provide a theoretical rationale for the
observed convexity in the fund floweperformance relation.
With respect to the risk-taking behaviour implied by this
asymmetric fund floweperformance relation, Berk and
Green (2004) present a theoretical model that predicts
a monotonic decreasing relation between fund perfor-
mance and subsequent risk-taking by managers. While the
empirical papers show that poorly performing funds
increase risk, they also find evidence that the relation
between risk-taking and prior performance may not be
monotonic. In fact, these studies find evidence of risk-
increasing also by the funds with the best performance.
Evidence of risk-increasing by better performing funds is
not consistent with the theoretical prediction in Berk and
Green (2004). A recent paper by Hu, Kale, Pagani, and
Subramanian (2011) presents a theoretical model that
includes career concerns of the manager, which is the
likelihood that the manager may be fired following poor
performance. The evidence in Chevalier and Ellison (1999a)
indicates that fund managers do indeed face significant risk
of losing the job. Hu et al. (2011) show that when the
manager’s payoff is convex and with absent career risk, all
managers, over- and under-performing, will increase risk.
However, including career risk in the mix leads to a non-
monotonic, roughly U-shaped, relation between risk-
taking and prior performance e risk-taking is initially
decreasing and ultimately increasing in prior performance.
The intuition is that the manager with poor performance
has high likelihood of being fired and, therefore, the payoff
convexity leads him to take more risk. The manager of the
top-performing fund, on the other hand, is so far away from
being fired that he increases risk simply to avail of the
benefits of the convex payoff. Hu et al. (2011) provide
empirical evidence that the relation between prior
performance and risk-taking is U-shaped. Another recent
paper, Huang, Sialm, and Zheng (2011) also provides
evidence that is consistent with such a non-monotonic
relation between prior fund performance and managerial
risk taking. Important issues such as career concerns and
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that risk taking is limited through regulatory guidelines (for
e.g., Indian mutual funds invest less than 1% of assets under
management (AUM) in futures and options as evidenced by
latest data from the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI).) and fund managers may not have a vibrant hedge
fund market to bid for their skills.Indian mutual fund industry: opportunities
and challenges: discussion
Anchor
Venkatesh Panchapagesan
Panellists
Sandesh Kirkire, CEO, Kotak Mahindra Asset
Management Company; Sandesh.Kirkire@kotak.
com
Sankaran Naren, CIO, Equities, ICICI Prudential
Mutual Funds; Sankaran_Naren@icicipruamc.com
K. N. Vaidyanathan, Chief Risk Officer, Mahindra
Group and former Executive Director, SEBI;
VAIDYANATHAN.KN@mahindra.com
Faculty and students from IIMB and other institu-
tions were part of the audience and they took part
in the discussion.Other research on mutual funds
As mentioned earlier, the research literature on mutual
funds is vast and covers a number of aspects e the earlier
sections described in some detail only a few of them. In this
section we will provide a very brief summary of research in
other areas of mutual fund research.
Several recent papers examine the effects of manage-
ment structure, namely, management by teams and side-
by-side management, and show that this factor is an
important determinant of MF performance. An earlier
paper in this genre is Chevalier and Ellison (1999b), which
shows the effect of the level of education of the MF
manager and fund performance. Golec (1996) relates
manager tenure to performance and Khorana, Servaes, and
Wedge (2007) show that managerial ownership affects
performance. Some of the recent papers in this strand of
literature include Nohel, Wang, and Zgeng (2010), Baer,
Kempf, and Ruenzi (2011), Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi
(2010), and Deuskar, Pollet, Wang, and Zheng (2012).
There are several papers that relate fund characteristics
to performance. Wermers (2000) shows that a fund’s turn-
over ratio has positive effect, and its expense ratio
a negative effect, on fund performance. Chen et al. (2004)
and Pastor and Stambaugh (2010) show that greater fund
inflows erode fund performance. Research, including
Khorana et al. (2007), Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008),
Deli (2002), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), and Massa and
Patgiri (2009) shows that fund governance mechanisms and
the presence of the advisory contract also affect fund
performance. Even in a legally well developed country like
the US, controversies abound on the real independence of
directors in mutual funds (see Tate (2000)). In India, mutual
fund companies need to have at least 50% of their directors
to be independent. Whether they really remain indepen-
dent and whether having a more active regulator like SEBI
can mitigate some of the weaknesses in traditional fund
governance mechanisms remains an empirical question.
The fund industry is characterised by the presence of fund
families and there are several papers that study the role and
effects of the fund family structure. Massa (2003) finds
a negative relation between performance and the degree of
product differentiation in the MF families, whereas Chen
et al. (2004) show that fund performance, controlling for
its own size, does not deterioratewith size of the fund family
it belongs to. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) find evidence
that MF families may cross subsidise the performance of
a favoured fund while Chen and Chen (2009) and Cici et al.
(2010) find that MF families that have both MFs and hedge
funds, favour hedge funds over the mutual funds. Cross-
subsidisation is possible in India as there are a limited
number of fund families floating a large number of equity and
debt funds. Recently, many debt-relatedmutual funds cameunder the SEBI radar in India following allegations that fund
families were moving losses from one fund to another to the
detriment of investors’ interests.
Finally, there is research which shows the effect of
institutional investment on the dynamics of asset prices.
Institutional managers, given their fiduciary responsibili-
ties, are expected to behave according to the “prudent
man rule” in law. Badrinath, Gay, and Kale (1989) and
Del Gurcio (1996) show that prudence leads to a preference
by institutional investors for bigger, low-risk, and low-
leverage firms. This preference affects the dynamics of
asset prices. Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995) present
theory and empirical evidence that the presence of
prudence results in the returns on portfolios with high
institutional interest leading the returns on the portfolio of
low institutional interest stocks. Subsequent papers
including Sias (1997), Boehmer, and Kelly (2009) and Cohen
and Frazzini (2008) present evidence on how ownership by
institutional investors affects other aspects of financial
markets such as liquidity and return predictability.
Unlike in the developed markets, emerging markets also
face a limited investable universe for mutual funds, which
could act as a sort of capacity constraint. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that though there are more than 5000
companies listed on the BSE, most fund managers seek to
invest in not more than 300e400 companies. The instability
of the Indian IPO market also has not provided a steady flow
of new companies that are deemed investable for these
funds. The small size of the investable universe, coupled
with growing AUM could exacerbate some of the price
dynamics suggested by the above research.Venkatesh Panchapagesan
Mutual funds are an area where not much academic work
has been done in India, but a lot of academic work has been
done globally. So this is an excellent opportunity for us to
talk to important practitioners in India who have been in
this field for a long time and who have seen the evolution of
this industry from the 1990s to the present. We have two
Indian mutual fund industry 249speakers joining us in person and there is one more speaker
who will join us over video conferencing.
SankaranNaren is the CIO of Equities from ICICI Prudential
Mutual Fund. He has about 20 years experience in the
financial services industry and he joined ICICI in 2004. He has
a B.Tech from IIT Madras and an MBA from IIM Calcutta.
Sandesh Kirkire is the CEO of Kotak Mahindra Asset
Management Company. He joined the group in 1994 and has
been CEO since 2005. He is a mechanical engineer and he
holds a master’s degree in management studies from Jam-
nalal Bajaj Institute of Management Studies, Mumbai
University. While Naren brings the equity experience, San-
desh has been on the fixed income side. So you have two
speakers who are managing money but at the same time,
they have different takes on the markets and this industry.
The third speaker K. N. Vaidyanathan e Vaidy e is
currently the Chief Risk Officer of the Mahindra Group but
before that he was part of the Securities and Exchange
Board of India (SEBI) as Executive Director in charge of the
institutional investors’ portfolio that included mutual
funds. He is also an MBA from IIM Ahmedabad.
Naren, would you like to begin by giving your view on the
industry and what do you think is going to happen?Sankaran Naren
I have seen and been an integral part of the mutual fund
industry since 2004. When I joined, the industry was at
a very nascent stage with total assets under management
(AUM) in the equity space pegged at about $450 million.
The industry has witnessed significant growth only from
2004. I learnt from Venky that in an aggregate market cap
of about $1.1 trillion, if you have $30 billion, then there is
potential to outperform the benchmark. Once that $30
billion dollars becomes as big as $150 billion, outperforming
the benchmark will become increasingly difficult.
Our industry is small and nascent and why the industry is
small is still a big question, because the taxation and
regulatory framework that we have in India is far better
than in most other countries. Today you don’t have entry
loads, and the taxation on mutual funds is very benign. If
you hold equity mutual funds for more than one year, there
is no tax on the capital gains in any equity scheme. There is
also no tax on dividends paid beyond the distribution tax.
So from a regulatory point of view, the regulations help the
mutual fund industry.
The other point that Venky made is that in the rest of
the world, hedge funds have become very big because they
provided attractive opportunities for talented fund
managers. Mutual funds have lost the best people to the
hedge funds. However, there is no taxation benefit in India
for hedge funds. It is not easy for the hedge funds to deliver
post tax returns similar to mutual funds. But despite that, I
believe that the reason why mutual funds have not become
big is because of the tendency of Indians to trade in equity
rather than invest with a long term view.
The second,which is specifically true in the last five years,
is that two other asset classes, gold and real estate, have
managed to give much better returns with much lower
volatility. Mutual fund investments are therefore being
pulled back due to two key factors at this point of time, (a)the fact that people make money in alternate asset classes
like real estate and gold and (b) people are inclined to trade
in equities on their own in India. This is evident from the fact
that we have one of the best futures markets in India
compared to most other places in the world. From my
experience of more than twenty years in equities, less than
1% of people have made money in derivatives markets. But
despite that, the derivatives market is the lynchpin of the
Indian equity market. In the next twenty years, inflows into
mutual funds have to improve, but for that to happen the two
alternate asset classes, real estate and gold, will have to
begin to give lower risk adjusted return than equities. Unlike
equities, in both assets, particularly in real estate, profit and
loss in not tracked daily. That adds to the glitter of the real
estate market because even if you have made a wrong
decision, every morning, you don’t get a mark- to-market
which will tell you that you have lost/gained money.
Going forward, I am of the opinion that investment in
equity mutual funds is going to increase significantly over
the next 10e20 years. Will it happen in the next one year?
No! This will only happen when the real estate cycle runs its
course and bottoms out. You cannot have a situation where
real estate is more expensive than in the US, while equities
are not. There are many companies where the real estate
value of their factories is much more than the market caps,
let alone the business which is generating profits. In view of
the higher upside potential, the next twenty year view on
mutual funds is extremely attractive.
Mutual funds have been through two phases e i) the
2004e2007 phase and ii) the 2010e12 phase. The 2010e12
is a fantastic phase because you do not have new fund
offers (NFOs) as the principal vehicle of collecting money. It
is all about performance delivery. If you have not delivered
returns in your funds, invertors will not invest. There are
about 250 schemes which exist in the equity market, and
less than twenty get inflows. The twenty that get inflows
have demonstrated consistency and good long term
performance. So, there is no disruptive competition, as in
2006e07, where an NFO collected all the money.
On the whole I would say that the industry is on an
extremely good regulatory and long term growth footing;
however, at the same time, in the near term the industry is
still facing a conundrum.
On the investment side, the period 2004e07 was a “risk-
on” everywhere in the world, including in India. In the
current phase, we can look at the West and learn what
went wrong there. For example, I was running a value fund
in 2004. One set of the funds were invested in financials and
it got crushed in the 2008 financial meltdown. The other set
of value funds was invested in low price to book stocks. This
set of funds faced very strict sector limitations on how
much you could invest in low price to book stocks, and
became the star funds of 2008. We learnt from this and
decided that our value funds cannot have disproportionate
allocation to any sector. We are observing mistakes made
round the world and this is helping us to go back to the
drawing board and fine tune our investment process.
I have been the fund manager at ICICI Prudential Mutual
Fund for the last eight years. In India, 2007 was a very
interesting year for us. There were funds which out-
performed the benchmark by 20%. I ran a few funds which
underperformed the benchmark by 20% in the year 2007.
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the year. However, my company and investors gave me
time, and what happened in 2007 got corrected between
2008 and 2012. It means that as a fund manager, I need to
take the right decisions for my investors in my scheme from
a long term view, instead of for the next few months. For
example, people say that the telecom sector is not doing
well and the problems may not get resolved shortly. Most
people would not invest in the telecom sector. But the fact
is that electricity, food and telecom are now basic human
needs and hence these sectors will improve over time. But
that cushion is available to only a few experienced mutual
fund managers in India. Unlike the new entrants in mutual
funds, people who have been in the industry for long can
take decisions based on long term benefits. The distributors
and the investors give us that benefit and that allows us to
take the right investment decisions which usually tends to
play out over the long term.
Our companies are not built for the bubble or for the
burst; they are built for the period in between.
On the whole, the current regulatory environment is very
investor friendly. However, the industry is still to see signif-
icant growth. Better awareness and investor education can
turn the tide. But the good thing is that there are talented
people in this industry. That puts us in a good position and we
will continue to learn out of the global experience.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan
I would like to raise a couple of points that Naren touched
upon and present the same problem from an academic
perspective. There is something unique about an emerging
economy like India, where information sharing varies across
different sectors. Klapper, Sulla, and Vittas (2004) have
found that markets which have very low regulatory
framework are poor in governance, poor in information
sharing and they are the places where growth is stunted.
This lines up with Naren’s observation about people being
inclined to trade in equities on their own in India. It also
lines up with the fact that investors here prefer to work
with no transparency. This makes it very hard for the
mutual fund managers to seek money.
Naren mentioned the long term view that mutual fund
managers have to take. Given that these managers face
daily redemption unlike hedge fund managers, it will be
hard for them to ignore short term pressures which could
lead to a big drop in their net asset values (NAVs). This is an
important issue that differentiates larger funds from
smaller funds. The smaller funds can get wiped out even
from a small jolt in the market while the larger funds have
some confidence which helps them to carry on with their
strategy. It is interesting in the Indian context to see
whether a bad performance by a mutual fund manager
would have a stigma attached to it, and whether it would
be a career concern.
Moreover, studies such as Brown et al. (1996) have
shown that mutual fund managers who are performing
badly would adopt riskier strategies than fund managers of
a fund which is doing very well.
Now we turn to Sandesh for his views on the current
state of the industry and its opportunities and challenges.Sandesh Kirkire
The current regulatory framework of the Indian mutual
fund industry has been in effect since 1996 whereas the
first mutual fund, US 64 (which does not exist anymore),
came into existence in 1964. US 64 never had a net asset
value, but was the largest fund! The regulation finally
happened in 1996 and if I remember correctly, US 64 folded
in the early part of 2000.
The Indian capital market has been in existence for over
a century now. The total Demat accounts (for both National
Security Depository Ltd e NSDL, and Central Depository
Service Ltd e CDSL) for a country of population of over 120
crores is about 2 crores. When you look at duplication
there, the assessment is that there are fewer than 75 lakh
investors in the country of 120 crores. Today mutual funds
would have total equity folios of close to 4 crores, so you
have duplication there as well. The estimate is that there
are between 75 lakh to 1 crore investors who have invested
in Indian equity markets through the mutual fund.
The real issue in India is thatwe do not have forced savings
in the equity markets as it exists globally. Financial literacy
continues to be low. Indian investors havehad toomany years
of administered interest rate regime. The total assets
managedby themutual fund industry has been9e12%of total
commercial banking deposits over the last 10e15 years. The
issues about financial literacy have been addressed globally
by bringing more investments into the capital markets
through their long term core/forced savings.
In the equity secondary market in India, in the retail
segment, for every 100 rupees that trades in that segment,
90 rupees is in derivatives, 10 rupees is in cash and I think
less than five rupees is in delivery. So, equity as an asset
class which is supposed to be long term, seems to be viewed
in a very short term manner. The longest investment for
a resident of India is in his provident fund (PF). But that
“longest investment” does not participate in the equity
markets. The finance ministry has laid down a regulatory
framework which determines, the investment pattern a PF
should have. Today it allows up to 15% of gold to equity
markets, but the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) which is
a defined benefit system does not invest in equities.
The retailisation of the capital market has always
happened through long term savings. Unfortunately, in
India, long term savings are not coming into the markets
where they should. That is the framework with which the
mutual fund industry is grappling to build assets today. So
you have a scenario whereby the retail investor believes
that equity is for the short term. At the same time, when
you look at the regulation and the framework, the mutual
fund industry stands out, as Naren said, as one of the best
in the world in terms of cost for the customers. Unfortu-
nately, the only financial product that the customer buys is
a bank deposit. For every other financial product, he needs
an advisor. This is so even for something like Exchange
Traded Funds, perhaps the lowest cost funds, which
a person can buy in the secondary market without any
advisor. Even Barclay’s Global, with some of the largest
ETFs in the world, is not retailised but sold by institutional
investors based on the pricing they have directly with the
customers.
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over the last decade or so across all products, there’s
reasonably large alpha that is being produced. Obviously, as
Naren was saying, as the size grows, the alpha creation will
become difficult. Investors expect mutual funds to produce
positive returns even if the underlying market is negative.
The question now is why we should be in this market
when the index has not moved in the past five years. I think
you have to go through a learning phase. In 2008, the
asset allocation would have skewed in favour of equities
due to the sharp rise in the markets. However the reba-
lancing of asset allocation did not happen. Markets always
give lumpy returns and therefore a pure asset allocation
exercise helps the investors. The Indian equity market is
significantly owned by foreign investors, about 30%
approximately, and global financial market activity does
impact us tremendously. The Indian market has a long way
to go and there is no doubt in my mind that an economy like
India will continue to have foreign flows. With aspirations
going up and everybody trying to produce positive returns,
investors would like to look at asset allocation as a favoured
way to create alpha over inflation. But one must look at the
fact that ultimately the mutual funds are pass through.
They will generate performance in line with what is
underlying and one needs to understand the kind of alpha
that they are going to get.
I have been in this industry since 1999, a few years since
the regulation came. I have seen a lot of changes.
Improvement in the basic financial literacy continues to be
the challenge. I was happy to see that CBSE Boards today
are looking at basic financial literacy courses in the 11th
and 12th standard. I think that will make people understand
better and equip them to research and invest when they
finally look at mutual funds. Mutual fund brings out some
degree of diversification, and some degree of alpha on the
broad market but the asset allocation principles is what one
would look at for creating that wealth.Figure 1 World mutual fund industry (Source: Data from ICI
fact book 2012).Venkatesh Panchapagesan
I have formulated certain themes that cover a gamut of
issues, from performance down to governance, in the
mutual fund industry. For each of the themes there are
a few exhibits that highlight the academic work done
abroad on those themes. The questions that people are
trying to tackle in the academic community and the kind of
results that they have found may be different in the Indian
context.
Let me begin by giving you a little bit of the context of
the mutual fund industry. The mutual fund industry is
a couple of centuries old, so it is not something that
cropped up recently. However, the first set of serious
academic studies which looked at the industry seriously was
in the 1960s. We are in a similar state in India where we
have a mutual fund industry which really took off in the mid
90s but we don’t have any academic study on the industry.
The reason I am emphasising “academic” is that academic
studies are generally objective and are open to debate. We
need to have a third party to look at the performance of the
industry and at alpha generation. Even in the US which is
considered high on financial literacy, the first study camealmost close to forty years after the fund industry itself
started.
How does India stand in the global scenario? The Indian
mutual fund is very tiny in the world’s stage (Fig. 1 e World
Mutual Fund Industry). Even within our cohorts in the BRICS
community our assets undermanagement are only $87 billion
as compared to Brazil which is a thousand billion. Brazil’s
growth also took place around the mid-90s. While the US
dominates the field the growth in the assets is coming from
emerging countries. When you consider mutual fund asset as
a proportion of GDP,which is a commonmetric to see howbig
the intermediate asset management is, again India is very
tiny (Fig. 2 e Mutual Fund Assets as Proportion of GDP). You
can think of it as a possible growth opportunity, or on the
other hand, you can say that we have unique structural
problems that are impeding growth.
If you consider the growth of our mutual fund assets
from the 1990s till the present they seem to mimic the
SENSEX growth (broader market) (Fig. 3 e Indian MF Growth
and SENSEX Growth). Most of the growth is in debt category,
especially the liquid/money market fund category. In the
US, there have been some recent innovations in the mutual
fund industry, called Target Date Funds, where people who
plan to retire in 20 years’ time allow the mutual fund
manager to make the decision of how to allocate their
money so that as they get closer and closer to retirement,
the amount of debt or the fixed income component in the
portfolio goes up. What one would want is to have lower
risk as one gets closer to the target. If you benchmark the
growth of the Indian mutual fund industry against another
developing economy, Brazil, you will find that there too,
growth has taken a long time (Fig. 4 e Brazil Debt and
Equity Fund Growth). So, when people say that the mutual
fund industry is not growing, we have to be patient because
a lot of institutional details need to be ironed out, which is
very difficult. For example if the universe of stocks does not
grow, increasing the mutual fund asset base is going to be
Figure 2 Mutual fund assets as a proportion of GDP (Source: ICI fact book 2012 for MF AUM data; world bank for GDP data).
252 J.R. Kale, V. Panchapagesanproblematic because then all the money will go towards the
few liquid stocks that are available.
In the US, you will see that households do own a lot of
mutual funds (Fig. 5 e Institutional and Household Owner-
ship of US MFs). Moreover, about half of the mutual fund
assets in the US come from retirement bonds. There is
a legal and a tax reason why it makes sense to put money
into a mutual fund for retirement and the mutual fund
industry in India is actively seeking similar concessions. The
pension fund industry is also in a very nascent stage in India
and it needs to be developed. If you look at the source of
the bonds the investors first purchased in the US, the first
one typically comes from an employer-sponsored retire-
ment bond (Table 1 e Employer-sponsored Retirement
Plans). The comparatively large investment in mutual fundsFigure 3 Indian MF growth and SENSEX growth (Source: Associati
(BSE)).through retirement bonds in the US was enabled by
a change in the law in the mid 1970s. Most investors go
through that route.
There has been a lot of academic work on fund perfor-
mance, on fund flows and size. The question being asked is,
what are the determinants of fund flows. You would expect
performance to be a natural determinant but it is not
necessarily true in lot of countries. Coming to size, there
has to be a natural limit to how much you can grow and how
big you can become Cost and performance are linked. But I
am de-linking the cost for this discussion to highlight the
fact that there are fixed costs and variable costs. The
variable costs are the ones that are important for an
investor. Then there is the issue of fund governance. The
relevant questions here are: How is the fund set up? Doeson of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) and Bombay Stock Exchange
Figure 4 Brazil debt and equity growth fund (Source: Varga and Wyngert (2010)).
Table 1 Employer-sponsored retirement plans.
Indian mutual fund industry 253the ownership of the mutual fund matter? How do the funds
themselves contribute to the governance of the companies
that they have invested in? Fund externalities are also
a very interesting issue. Even though the investment
management community views it mostly as an alpha
producing factory, they are a lot of externalities that you
and I face in having active mutual funds in the economy. For
example, they improve asset pricing, they improve market
efficiency. If you believe they are sophisticated investors,
they produce information which gets into prices and that
does good for all of us. Similarly they are very good in giving
liquidity in the market place because they are large
investors/large traders. There are several questions that
arise on all these themes.
Next, let me share with you the academic state-of-the-
art on mutual fund performance. Unlike in India where
mutual fund managers are “rock stars” and are making lots
of alphas, in most countries mutual fund managers on an
average, underperform the market. This has been borne
out in studies at large. There is a very interesting academic
paper (Cremers, Ferriera, Matos, and Starks, 2011) which
looks at mutual funds across the globe and the highlightFigure 5 Institutional and household ownership of US MFs
(Source: ICI).here is that only 36% of mutual funds outperform the simple
four-factor model (such as momentum factor, value factor
etc) as the benchmark (See Cremers et al., 2011, p. 38,
Table 6, Funds with positive abnormal performance by
country). So what it really says is that if you use a very
naive strategy where you are just taking money and putting
it into a simple model, you should be doing as well as the
mutual fund manager 60% of the time. This is across all
countries, some of them developed, some of them not
developed. It would be interesting to hear the thoughts of
the speakers as to what the state in India is and what the
source of that alpha is here.
My first question to the speakers here is: There is
a general perception that Indian mutual funds make
alpha. What is the source of this alpha? The source mustSource: ICI
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are able to have vis-a-vis the general public or it could
be that they take public information and process it
better. If it is the latter, then you can argue for things
like quantitative management. Could you begin by
telling us how alpha is defined in India?
Sankaran Naren: Alpha is defined with respect to the
benchmark of the specific fund. If it is a mid cap fund, it
would be a mid cap index. If it is a large cap fund, it
would be either equity or BSE Top 100 or Sensex.
From my experience, till 2006 not enough companies
were actually researched by the market players. There
was inadequate company research so if you had done your
research before the research analysts in the sell side
actually started to cover the company, you made money.
2007 was the year where I underperformed the benchmark
and it was a bubble year as far as I could see. I believe
that post 2008 the alpha that was generating in India was
primarily because there was an external problem either in
Europe or the US where the Foreign Institutional Investor
(FII) size of the market is roughly $200 billion. Ours is
about $30 billion. The behaviour of the $200 billion market
is based on what they see in their part of the world.
Hence, when long-term refinancing operations (LTRO)
begin, they start aggressively buying Indian equity. We in
India don’t focus so much on LTRO and we start selling.
Then suddenly Greece and Spain have problems; they start
selling and we start buying. In my opinion, the $200 billion
of FII money in India post-financial crisis is behaving in
a very volatile manner. They keep buying and selling
based on what they see in their part of the world and
therefore keep losing alpha to Indian investors in India.
Secondly, I think it has become relatively easy to generate
alpha in the last 4e5 years because the low quality
companies have been under-performing. When the low
quality companies start outperforming in the next few
years, generating alpha will be that much more difficult
and challenging.
Sandesh Kirkire: Fund managers work with earnings
model estimates for their investee companies to generate
the alpha on their underlying fund benchmarks.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan: We heard from both the
speakers. Naren was talking more about how foreign
flows give us a chance to produce alpha. Sandesh was
saying that there is a fundamental stock selection. This
leads us to the next question. Both these things can be
done by somebody sitting abroad. Technically, if some-
body has the information set that you had, whether it is
fund flow information or stock level information, as long
as it’s public, it should be relatively doable by somebody
sitting in Singapore or the US and making the same
decisions to buy or sell. But there is some evidence that
the domestic managers managing mutual funds on Indian
equities are actually doing better than foreign funds.
There are foreign fund managers who are also investing
in Indian equities and they are doing worse. So is there
private information advantage at play or is it public
information that you can process better? The evidence
doesn’t seem to support the fact that there is simplefundamental analysis that is responsible for the
performance.
Sankaran Naren: From 2007 to 12, it has been very easy
because we knew globally which were the companies
with higher quality and which were the companies with
lower quality, based on our local insight. So, we just
avoided the companies with lower quality and generated
alpha during that period. Secondly, I think behavioural
finance theory has ensured that the investor sitting in
a European city managing India money is not able to
conquer his behavioural biases based on the problems
around him. Locally we could understand which
companies were not doing things well and that gave us
an insight over the offshore managers. But to answer
Venky’s question, I think alpha came through both these
factors/ sources.
Sandesh Kirkire: I think being on the ground, seeing
what is actually happening, meeting companies and
their suppliers/vendors, the domestic fund managers do
have better access and have their ear to the ground. The
deep fundamental analysis does help the fund managers
in alpha generation.
Audience: Naren, you were talking about the growth of
the industry. What kind of growth, in numerical terms,
are you expecting for the next 20 years?
Sankaran Naren: If we use 10% of the market cap as
a rough estimate, the size of mutual fund assets should
be around Rs 110 billion. Now we are Rs 30 billion.
Obviously, that number will go up or down depending on
the extent to which mutual fund can penetrate in India.
Audience: What are the regulatory framework projec-
tions that you are expecting in the next two decades?
With the availability of pension funds we will have more
of money coming out of PFs, maybe to mutual funds.
Then taxation might be different in a couple of decades.
So what kind of regulations are you expecting?
Sankaran Naren: The longest investment that the Indian
citizen makes is the provident fund which does not invest
in domestic equities. With effect from 1st January 2004
the central government and subsequentlymost of the new
state government employees have moved from defined
benefit to defined contribution. The act is yet to get
passed but I think that’s the way ahead. Even the data
would suggest that over 50% of equity market access for
global investors, especially in the developed economies,
has happened through the pensions to retirement savings.
Going forward, this will be a big jump for institutionali-
sation of the domestic capital markets.
Sandesh Kirkire: The Direct Tax Code (DTC) is moving
away from exempt-exempt-exempt (EEE) to exempt-
exempt-tax (EET). The EET framework globally has
seen large flows of capital from retail investors into the
capital markets through 401(K) kind of retirement
schemes. We have seen the entire defined benefit (DB)
-defined contribution (DC) discussion in the global
Indian mutual fund industry 255markets and how companies and nations have failed
because of the DB issues. The government did catch up
with that at the right time way back in 2008 to move
away from the DB path. That is where I believe the
institutionalisation of capital markets will be.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan: I want to bring in Vaidy into
our conversation. What do you think the regulation
ought to be in the mutual fund sector and how do you
visualise it going forward?
K. N. Vaidyanathan: In India positive government policy
to the mutual fund industry is very limited. It is more in
the realm of tax arbitrage which is why you see a lot of
institutional corporate players and banks coming into
the mutual funds and not so much retail, long term
money. You don’t have the equivalent of 401K that you
have in the United States. To me the big determinant is
government policy. Only then can the mutual fund
industry move away from the push or sell approach
where they collect customers one by one into a pull
approach where mass consumers sign up. If the mutual
fund industry has to have a good shot at making things
happen a lot of regulatory arbitrage has to move. There
is a big trade off that the mutual fund industry is faced
with. A large part of the industry today benefits from the
tax arbitrage and a large part of the industry’s growth is
hampered by regulatory arbitrage.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan: Can you explain what you
mean by the regulatory arbitrage?
K. N. Vaidyanathan: One of the hangovers of the regu-
latory environment in our country in financial services is
that we tend to think of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
as the benchmark. When RBI put out its regulatory
framework, it separated banking and non-banking
activities. So in the 1980s when banks set up the
housing finance companies or capital markets or
merchant banking or mutual fund they said, that’s non-
banking, you keep them separate. This suited RBI
because vertical splitting was by function. Subsequently
we have developed regulators around products, not
functions; so we have the regulator for mutual funds,
a regulator for insurance, a regulator for pension and so
on. What you don’t have is a regulator by function. So
Sandesh and Naren are governed by the SEBI regulatory
environment for mutual funds. His counterparts who
manage insurance money are governed by Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) regula-
tions and a third person is governed by Pension Fund
Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) regula-
tions and so on. That has, in effect, hurt the asset
management industry. We have confused the product
and the service provider of the product and the func-
tion. Each of the products is stunted. Asset management
is a business of skill and scale. Now we have asset
management business that has been fragmented across
different products. Worse, identical products are
subject to very different regulation depending on
whether the regulator is at a phase where he thinks hehas to support development or at a phase where he
thinks he has to bring in tighter control.
I’ll take specifically the point on something that I tried
to do when I was at SEBI and a lot of it is yet to be done. In
trying to solve the issues regarding the asset manager, we
have actually created more issues e The asset manager of
a mutual fund till about a year ago was told that he had to
stay focused on the mutual funds he managed. If he
managed any other money under something called 24e 2,
he had to show Chinese walls to say that there were
completely different people, different processes and
different incentive structures.
In the insurance industry, it was declared that in the first
round you can appoint mutual funds asset management
companies (AMCs) as managers. Then they went retrograde
to say that the asset management had to be done within the
insurance company. So the opportunity to bring scale across
mutual funds and the insurance industry was lost when IRDA
said that’s got to be separate. Next, we created the PFRDA
which was not too clear whose particular interest it served.
It came out with a bunch of regulations for which there
appear to be no consumers.
So, you have regulatory arbitrage which is created
around scaling and asset management business. Then you
have regulatory arbitrage around product. So if Naren and
Sandesh run an equity mutual fund, over the last 3e4 years,
SEBI has significantly tightened a lot of the regulations in
terms of how much they can pay out, in terms of derisking
norms. The other regulators have not quite caught up. So,
since 2010, we find that there were two identical products,
one subject to extremely tight regulation that Sandesh and
Naren had to work under and the other subject to fairly
relaxed regulation because the regulator believed that he
had a “developmental” role to support. So the regulatory
arbitrage to me, is not so much about SEBI tightening
mutual fund regulation as much as government policy
towards the asset management industry, towards long term
savings generation and government attitude towards
coming down on all of these regulatory arbitrages so that
you can get people to play on a level playing field.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan: When you said that in India
the key thing is regulation by products as opposed to
regulating the functions, how is it in the other countries?
K. N. Vaidyanathan: China, in a number of ways on the
asset management industry, does a fairly good copy
paste of the Indian framework. The best reference point
for the asset management industry is the United States.
The US has the asset management company which goes
through a completely independent set of regulations
from the underlying product. In the US insurance is
a product that has State regulators; nobody has taken
that away but nothing stops the insurance company from
appointing an asset manager who comes under the
investment companies’ act to manage a portion of the
money or all of it. Similarly, you could have sponsors of
mutual funds appoint a completely different manager.
The point I am making is you need product regulation if
government policy is to push certain products (and the
government has a role to push certain products,
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side, you need a well thought through regulatory envi-
ronment in terms of service providers to these products.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan: The debate on regulatory
arbitrage even happens in the US. During the recent
financial crisis a lot of hedge funds were selling products
to pension funds and insurance companies e that was
not regulated because they slipped through the cracks of
different regulations. The point I am trying to make is
that even in the US, regulatory arbitrage does exist and
it is a function of the fact that you have multiple legacy
regulatory jurisdictions as markets are getting more and
more integrated.
K. N. Vaidyanathan: I think they are two different
things. In the United States it is not so much regulatory
arbitrage as much as a case of “the regulator slept at his
desk”. In India it is more about arbitrage. The funda-
mental difference is in the attitude towards investor
protection and the difference in regulating functions in
the United States and India. The US is extremely
advanced in its regulation of the asset management
companies and in the regulation of products but it is not
so advanced if somebody cleverly pushes what is
perceived as an unregulated product into a quasi regu-
lator and that’s where the damage happened in the US.
We need to make this distinction very clear. The regu-
latory arbitrage that we have here in India is that
product distribution guidelines are different, asset
diversification guidelines are different, investor protec-
tion rules are different across identical products but
between different regulators.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan: This is a good primer on the
regulations e how the mutual fund regulations could
have a huge impact on the kind of money that’s coming,
whether it is smart money, dumb money and so on.
I want to come back to the conversation we had prior to
the regulation discussion which is on the development of
the market, especially the point that the market itself, the
investment universe, is not capable of handling huge
inflows. From the position of the mutual fund manager, the
asset prices can be highly distorted if more money is
chasing too few stocks. Despite that, managers will still
look good because they are comparing themselves against
the benchmark. But from the social angle it is questionable
whether these prices are justifiable or not. If suddenly the
inflows double, what would you like to see, where would
the money go? Are there firms that you would like to invest
in if you had flows which are not in the top 200 or 300?
Sankaran Naren: I would say that 2007 was the only year
inmy entire careerwhere flowswere higher thanwhatwe
could manage. Otherwise, all throughout flows have been
very low. The disinvestment rule of the government of
India has got into trouble because barring LIC no one had
enough money to put a big sum of money in a disinvest-
ment. So there are absolutely no problems of deployment
at this point of time. We do not have a problem with
managing size. We created scale in the industry in 2007
which can handle much larger amounts of money than isbeing done now; I can handle three times the amount of
money that we do today with the existing team. So I think
we are far away from that problem and are actively
looking forward to increased flows into mutual funds.
Sandesh Kirkire: Even if we reach there, ultimately at
that point of time, hopefully there will be a reasonable
amount of globalisation and domestic investment
managers will start looking at opportunities outside
India. Today we have funds which invest abroad but I
think we are far away from that possibility at this
juncture, based on our assessment of the market.
K. N. Vaidyanathan: Two things structurally are chal-
lenges for India. One, equity mutual fund cannot run
ahead of equity investing. The equity investing in this
country is about one and a half percent of the pop-
ulation, much less than 10% of the households which is 1
in 4 in the UK and 1 in 3 in the United States. So the equity
culture is extremely under developed, despite the
attention paid to it in the media. There is a lot of noise,
but very little sound. The second structural issue is that
we have size but no strength. We claim to have up to 6000
listed companies but if you ask Naren what his universe
is, it would not go beyond item number 300. We confuse
size with strength. And product differentiation becomes
very difficult unless you take incremental risks and go
beyond number 250 or 300. The liquidity drops precipi-
tously after that. So, my worry on the second point is, it
may be fine today, it may be fine when S30 billion
becomes $60 billion but if you cross $60 billion, you don’t
have enough opportunity to create diversification. I see
a problem not so much as a demand side constraint but as
a supply side constraint, in equity investing in India.
Sankaran Naren: Given the environment where growth
has not decelerated for eight successive quarters, I think
we will eventually move from a $30 billion to $60 billion
industry. Hopefully it should happen at a time when the
economy is also in a growth phase as it was in the
2004e2007 phase when we had the ability to manage 500
to 600 billion dollars. If you are going to have asset
growth without economic growth, it’s a problem but it is
unlikely to happen. So that’s why I think this issue is not
as big as it appears to be. While I don’t deny what Vaidy
is saying, I believe that economic growth, corporate
growth, the smaller companies becoming bigger etc will
all be aligned and will happen at the same time.
Audience: In the last four years, the economy has grown
really well. What has been the supply of good quality
new stocks by way of IPO’s or FPO’s? If you go by popular
discourse in the financial media, it looks like a large
majority of IPOs that have hit the market in the last 3e4
years are not investment worthy stocks. So, does
economic growth always translate into high quality
investment opportunities?
Sankaran Naren: In China, high quality growth and high
quality companies have evolved together. In India,
2004e2007 was marked by growth in infrastructure;
2008e2012 was marked by growth in consumption. Equity
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consumption industry is underleveraged, so it doesn’t
require equity. The challenge is tomove to amodel where
infrastructure projects attract highest quality compa-
nies. If not the highest quality, infrastructure should
attract higher growth companies like it was in 2004e2007.
Audience: Taking off from Naren’s point about real
estate as the real asset, gold is a commodity; why are
you not getting into real commodity investment which
will give you a better diversification, which will give you
a return on your investment?
Sandesh Kirkire: We made a beginning with gold. The
issue is that there was a regulatory framework; the
inter-regulatory arbitrage which Vaidy just mentioned
exists even for commodities. You have separate regula-
tions for financial markets and for commodities markets.
K. N. Vaidyanathan: Our approach to creating regula-
tors is like creating power houses. Each regulator
fiercely protects his turf. For example, with great
difficulty, we managed to get gold ETF off the ground
but when NSE wanted to start gold futures, we had
a potential earthquake kind of scenario. The mindset of
protecting one’s turf has to change. The second point
is, as students you need to think a little deeper. There
is a big danger in promoting some of these products.
You need to think through whether this is an asset class
for which we need to create a vehicle that will go to
the retail audience. On commodities I have my doubts
but those are my personal concerns. Students need to
research and say how much of this is value creation,
how much of this is zero sum game and if it is a zero
sum game, is it something you want to promote in a big
way. This is a philosophical debate that I want to put
down on the table.
K. N. Vaidyanathan: I want to leave you with
a perspective which is different (based on the fact that I
did spend two years in a government role). It is unreal to
think there are rational tangible attributes like perfor-
mance which dictate decisions. Let me put that in
context. In the global scene if performance of a product
mattered, aerated drinks would never exist, there would
only be water. Management students need to delve little
more into that and little less into the academic realm of
performance, you will find far better insights into
understanding the growth of the mutual fund industry
and its prospects forward.
Venkatesh Panchapagesan: It has been a great conver-
sation, though we haven’t covered all the topics that I
had intended for the panelists. Thank you all for joining
in the discussion.References
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